The Myth of Embodied Metaphor by Nikola Kompa
195
Croatian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. XVII, No. 50, 2017
The Myth of Embodied Metaphor
NIKOLA KOMPA
Institute of Philosophy, 
University of Osnabrück, Osnabrück, Germany
According to a traditionally infl uential idea metaphors have mostly or-
namental value. Current research, on the other hand, stresses the cogni-
tive purposes metaphors serve. According to the Conceptual Theory of 
Metaphor (CTM, for short), e.g., expressions are commonly used meta-
phorically in order to conceptualize abstract and mental phenomena. 
More specifi cally, proponents of CTM claim that abstract terms are un-
derstood by means of metaphors and that metaphor comprehension, in 
turn, is embodied. In this paper, I will argue that CTM fails on both 
counts.
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1. Introduction
According to a traditionally infl uential idea, metaphors have mostly 
ornamental value. Yet current research in philosophy, linguistics and 
psychology points in a different direction and stresses the cognitive 
functions metaphors might serve. According to a rather popular, con-
temporary account of metaphor, the so-called Conceptual Theory of 
Metaphor, expressions are commonly used metaphorically in order to 
conceptualize abstract and mental phenomena. Metaphor comprehen-
sion, in turn, is said to be embodied. In the background is a family of 
* I am very grateful to Dunja Jutronić and Stephen Neale who invited me to a 
conference on the philosophy of language and linguistics in Dubrovnik and gave me 
the opportunity to present an earlier version of the manuscript. I would also like to 
thank the other participants of the conference as well as audiences at the Universities 
of Munich and Cologne for their valuable comments and critique, and Kristina Liefke 
and Stefan Hinterwimmer for inviting me to give talks at the respective Universities. 
Finally, I would like to thank the participants of the colloquium at the Institute of 
Philosophy at the University of Osnabrueck for reading and commenting on earlier 
drafts of the manuscript and Rudi Owen Muellan for proofreading the fi nal version.
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theories that are united by the claim that language comprehension in 
general is embodied.
In this paper, I will fi rst sketch the basic idea of embodied approach-
es to language comprehension and examine some of the evidence that 
has been brought forth in favor of the claim that language comprehen-
sion in general is embodied. Then the problem of abstract terms will 
we raised; abstract terms make trouble for embodied approaches as 
sensorimotor information doesn’t seem to be required for understand-
ing these terms. The remainder of the paper will be devoted to the topic 
of metaphor. From an embodied point of view, metaphors are not only 
an interesting phenomenon in its own right; they also promise to help 
explain how we come to understand abstract terms. Consequently, I 
will address the questions of whether we understand abstract terms 
by means of metaphors and whether metaphor comprehension itself 
is embodied. Eventually, I will argue that both questions have to be 
answered in the negative.
2. Embodied Approaches to Language Comprehension
Within the paradigm of Situated Cognition,1 which spans a rather 
wide and varied research area, the claim that cognition is embodied 
has gained some prominence (cf., e.g., Shapiro 2011, 2014). My concern 
will be with (so-called) embodied approaches to language comprehen-
sion. The following quote by Jerome Feldman and Srinivas Narayanan 
epitomizes the central idea
that all understanding involves simulation or enacting the appropriate em-
bodied experience. When asked to grasp, we enact it. When hearing or read-
ing about grasping, we simulate grasping (…). (Feldman and Narayanan 
2004: 389)
Moreover, the enactment or simulation in question
is not grounded in previous sensorimotoric experiences of a generic sort, but 
instead invokes rather specifi c sensorimotoric experiences. (Scorolli 2014: 
127)
This is also put by saying that modality-specifi c representations, as op-
posed to amodal, abstract representations, are evoked in language com-
prehension. These representations are similar to those we form when 
we directly experience our environment (cf. Barsalou 1999). They are 
located in regions of the brain devoted to action and perception. “Cogni-
tion is inherently perceptual, sharing systems with perception at both 
the cognitive and neural levels.”—Lawrence Barsalou claims (Barsalou 
1999: 577); and language comprehension is a case in point. So the idea, 
basically, is that in order to understand a linguistic expression one has 
to simulate the corresponding experience. When I hear the word ‘grasp’ 
1 Here is a popular way of partitioning the fi eld: “According to our usage, then, 
situated cognition is the genus, and embodied, enactive, embedded, distributed 
cognition and their ilk are species“ (Robbins and Aydede 2009b: 3).
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I simulate (reenact) the action of grasping. And since I have grasped 
before, I will be successful and come to understand the word in ques-
tion. Simulation, in turn, requires activation in sensory and motor (as 
well as affective) regions of the brain because in simulating a particu-
lar experience we exhibit roughly the same pattern of neural activity 
that accompanied the initial experience. Language comprehension cru-
cially involves recruitment of the sensory-motor system.
Yet why speak of embodiment here? As Philip Robbins and Murat 
Aydede point out
... not all forms of embodiment involve bodily dependence in the strict and 
literal sense. Indeed, most current research on embodiment focuses on the 
idea that cognition depends on the sensorimotor brain, with or without di-
rect bodily involvement. (Robbins and Aydede 2009b: 5)
There are other notions of embodiment; and they all need sorting out. 
For now, let the Embodiment Claim (EC, for short) be the following 
claim:
ECsim: Simulation is necessary for language comprehension.
Those who march under the banner all agree that EC is “supported by 
a growing body of evidence…” (Kaschak et al. 2014: 118)
3. Evidence
Evidence is provided by studies that investigate whether during lan-
guage processing there is activation in regions of the brain devoted to 
action and perception. There are different types of studies; neuroim-
aging and behavioral studies, e.g. (for an overview, cf. Kaschak et al. 
2014). Here is a short selection of some extensively discussed studies.
First, there are fMRI-studies that show that processing verbs, which 
denote actions performed by hand (pick, grasp), foot (kick) or mouth 
(lick) elicits activation in the motor (and premotor) cortex (in a somato-
topically organized manner). Various studies by Friedmann Pulvermül-
ler, Olaf Hauk, Lisa Aziz-Zadeh and others found a strong congruence 
between those areas in the brain that are activated during the observa-
tion of actions performed by hand, mouth and foot and those areas acti-
vated during processing linguistic phrases relating to hand, mouth and 
foot (Hauk et al. 2004; Pulvermüller 2005, Aziz-Zadeh et al. 2006). The 
same region is activated when seeing someone grasp a handle and when 
hearing the sentence “She grasps the handle”, for example.
Secondly, there are various behavioral studies. In a so-called action-
sentence congruity task, Arthur Glenberg and Michael Kaschak (2002) 
asked participants to judge whether sentences are sensible or not. 2 The 
(sensible) sentences in question imply either movement away or move-
2 As Fred Adams points out, it is not clear what Glenberg and Kaschak mean by 
“sensible”. It cannot mean “meaningful”, because in the case of sentences which are 
not sensible (such as “Hang the coat on the upright cup”) “it is because one knows what 
these sentences mean that one can tell that they are FALSE …” (Adam 2010: 623) 
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ment towards the body (“He opens the drawer”/”He closes the drawer”). 
Answering the sensibility question also requires either a movement 
away from or towards the body. As a result, participants are faster to 
make sensibility judgments when the direction of the response move-
ment matches the direction of the movement implied by the sentence 
in question. If the sentence is “He opens the drawer”, then participants 
are faster if the ‘sensible’ (yes) response requires a movement towards 
the body. This is taken to show that processing the sentences already 
activates motor regions in the brain; people simulate the action implied 
in the sentence. And there is interference if one mentally simulates a 
drawing move, yet has to make a pushing move in response.
In another study participants perform a picture-sentence congru-
ity task (Stanfi eld, Zwaan and Yaxley 2002). They read the sentence 
“The eagle is in the sky” or the sentence “The eagle is in its nest”, 
and then view pictures of objects and have to say whether the object 
depicted was mentioned in the sentence. The picture is either of an 
eagle with outstretched wings or an eagle with folded wings. It was 
found that participants respond faster when the content of the picture 
matches the image the sentence evokes. If the sentence is “The eagle 
is in the sky” and the picture depicts an eagle with outstretched wings 
they respond faster as when the picture depicts an eagle with wings 
folded. This is taken to show that the participants employ perceptual, 
modality-specifi c (as opposed to amodal) representations in processing 
language. These perceptual representations entertain an “analogue re-
lationship” (Stanfi eld and Zwaan 2001: 153) to what they represent; 
they represent details of the object that amodal representations would 
fail to represent, such as, e.g., folded wings.
These studies lend support to the claim that people occasionally en-
gage in simulation when processing language. But this is not quite the 
claim at issue. The claim is not just that simulation is a byproduct of or 
occasionally happens to accompany language processing. Rather—as 
pointed out before—the claim is supposed to be a stronger claim to the 
effect that simulation is at least a necessary condition for language 
comprehension.3
Some seem to defend an even stronger claim according to which un-
derstanding just IS simulation. Vittorio Gallese and George Lakoff, e.g., 
claim that understanding is imagination; and they further claim that the 
latter is (mental) simulation (Gallese and Lakoff 2005). Rolf Zwaan and 
Michael Kaschak have it that in “a very literal sense, the comprehen-
sion of a sentence about removing the pie from the oven relies on much 
the same machinery that would be involved in actually carrying out the 
action” (Zwaan and Kaschak 2009: 368). In a similar vein, Raymond 
Gibbs declares that his “personal view is that online language process-
ing is best characterized as a simulation process …” (Gibbs 2005: 87). 
3 Of course, the notion of simulation also stands in dire need of clarifi cation (cf., 
e.g., Sanford 2008).
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And with respect to terms expressing emotional states, Glenberg and 
colleagues, e.g. hold that “understanding of language about emotional 
states requires that those emotional states be simulated, or partially in-
duced, using the same neural and bodily mechanisms as are recruited 
during emotional experience.“ (Glenberg et al. 2005: 120) (The list is not 
meant to be exhaustive.) But then, given that something like semantic 
memory (and presumably other faculties as well) is also necessary for 
language comprehension, one might think that simulation can at best be 
a necessary condition for understanding—unless it could be shown that 
semantic memory is located in sensory-motor regions of the brain (on the 
neural correlates of semantic memory cf., e.g., Binder and Desai 2011).4
Moreover, even the weaker claim that simulation is (only) necessary 
for language comprehension is not uncontroversial. Not only have the 
results by Hauk, Pulvermüller and others come under attack recent-
ly. For example, in a meta-analysis of 29 studies Christie Watson and 
colleagues conclude that they “did not fi nd evidence for consistent in-
volvement of premotor or motor cortices in the representation of action 
concepts. At the very least, this fi nding argues against the hypothesis 
that premotor or motor cortex activations are inherent to the process 
of understanding action concepts.” (Watson et al. 2013: 1202). What is 
also missing in order to put the claim that simulation is necessary for 
comprehension on a fi rm empirical footing is not so much empirical evi-
dence that there are cases in which there is comprehension as well as 
simulation but rather evidence that if there is no simulation (sensory-
motor activation) then there is no comprehension. Yet that claim is not 
corroborated by empirical investigation. Rather, there is evidence to the 
contrary. In discussing various studies with apraxic patients, Bradford 
Mahon and Alfonso Caramazza reach the conclusion that “cognitive 
neuropsychological studies of patients with sensory and/or motor im-
pairments demonstrate that such impairments do not necessarily give 
rise to conceptual defi cits.” (Mahon and Caramazza 2008: 59). Patients 
suffering from apraxia are impaired at using objects, but can commonly 
name the objects (such as a hammer) and say what they are used for. 
Mahon and Caramazza relate the case of a patient who has been care-
fully studied and who was “not able to produce any correct pantomime of 
object use”, was “severely impaired at using actual objects correctly” but 
was “fl awless at naming object associated pantomimes…” (Mahonand 
Caramazza 2005: 483). Production (or simulation) and recognition may 
not be as closely connected as embodied theories predict.
4. Abstract terms
Moreover, so far we have mostly been talking about verbs denoting ac-
tions that we can perform. But one might wonder whether we do not 
also understand verbs denoting experiences or actions that we cannot 
4 Thanks to Markus Kneer for helpful discussion here.
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simulate or perform; don’t we understand the sentence “The dog’s tail 
began to wag”, for example (cf. Hickok 2014)? And, don’t we also under-
stand words that do not denote actions or sensory experiences at all? 
This brings us to the problem of abstract terms, which, in turn, will 
bring us to the topic of metaphor.
Abstract terms make trouble for embodied approaches to language 
comprehension because motor or sensory information doesn’t seem to 
be all that relevant to understanding these terms. Yet Laurence Bar-
salou claims that appearance is deceptive here. He has it that even 
abstract concepts such as TRUTH “can be represented perceptually” 
(Barsalou 1999: 600; Barsalou 2009). Jesse Prinz also thinks that all 
that is needed are modal, perceptual representations. He invites us to 
(c)onsider justice. One way to understand this lofty idea is by grounding it 
in very concrete scenarios. There are different kinds of injustice, and each 
can be captured by simulating an event. First, there is inequality. This can 
be simulated by imagining a situation in which I get two cookies and you get 
three. Second, there is inequity. For example, you might give me one cookie 
in exchange for two. Third, there is violation of rights. Suppose I try to eat 
my cookie and you prevent me from doing so. (Prinz 2012: 129)
Let us gloss over the fact that the situations described are cases of in-
justice, not justice. Prinz continues:
We learn the concept by means of very simple cases and then need to fi gure 
out whether more complicated cases are suffi ciently similar to these (…) 
Still, the simple scenarios can give us a very concrete idea of what justice 
is, and that is suffi cient for grounding our understanding of this seemingly 
abstract concept. (Prinz 2012: 129)
Note that Prinz uses “simulation” with a slightly different meaning. 
“Simulation” here rather means something like “mental imagery”, the 
conscious evoking of a particular scenario. And he also seems to defend 
a stronger view according to which simulation is not only necessary 
and also suffi cient for language comprehension.
Yet simulating a particular scenario by means of (conscious) mental 
imagery cannot be a necessary condition for understanding linguistic 
phrases. Otherwise we would all be very busy vicariously experiencing 
prior events of injustice while reading the newspaper (there is obvious-
ly a cognitive-load-problem lurking in the background). Also, according 
to Prinz, “we learn the concept by means of very simple cases and 
then need to fi gure out whether more complicated cases are suffi ciently 
similar to these“ (Prinz 2012: 129). But grasping what various concrete 
cases have in common is exactly the purpose abstract ideas are sup-
posed to serve; it is their job description. Consequently, abstract ideas 
come in through the back door. Finally, if all it takes to understand or 
grasp the concept of justice is to simulate various specifi c scenarios, 
then, given that people, arguably, tend to simulate different scenarios, 
no shared meaning will emerge.
Therefore, I conclude, admittedly without having fully argued the 
point, that accounts that try to ground abstract ideas “in concrete sce-
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narios” fail to explain how comprehension of abstract terms such as 
“truth” or “justice” can be embodied.5 Fortunately, there is a very popu-
lar account in contemporary cognitive linguistics that is happy to vol-
unteer an alternative explanation.
5. The Conceptual Theory of Metaphor 
Abstract concepts are metaphorical, the Conceptual Theory of Meta-
phor, CTM for short, claims. According to George Lakoff, one of the 
founding fathers of CTM, “everyday abstract concepts like time, states, 
change, causation, and purpose turn out to be metaphorical“. (Lakoff 
1993: 203) Mark Johnson, his brother-in-arms, has it that “[a]ll theo-
ries are based on metaphors because all our abstract concepts are met-
aphorically defi ned” (Johnson 2008: 51). But they not only claim that 
abstract concepts are metaphorical(ly defi ned). They also claim that 
metaphor comprehension is embodied! 
The idea that abstract terms are metaphorical has intuitive appeal. 
In using metaphors, we try to understand one kind of phenomenon in 
terms of another, and we thereby often borrow from the concrete realm 
of sensory experience in order to conceptualize abstract and mental 
phenomena (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). We feel blue, complain about 
her being cold or thin-skinned, we let people “chew over new sugges-
tions and digest new information” (Deutscher 2005: 122), and we say 
that someone’s theory needs more support, is about to collapse, etc. We 
talk about abstract, ‘elusive’ things such as emotions, information or 
theories in terms of more concrete phenomena and mundane activities 
such as temperature, digestion or buildings. 
But CTM is not really a theory about linguistic usage as metaphor 
is “not a fi gure of speech but a mode of thought…” (Lakoff 1993: 210). 
These modes of thought are called conceptual metaphors (hence the 
name of the theory). They are “mappings across conceptual domains” 
(Lakoff 1993: 203); more specifi cally, they are mappings from a source 
domain which is commonly less abstract onto a target domain which 
is commonly more abstract. Here is a somewhat overworked example 
that nonetheless nicely illustrates the point. Let us try to map the do-
main of journeys onto the domain of love. This is what we get.
5 For a more comprehensive overview over the debate about abstract terms, cf. 
also, e.g., Dove 2011, 2014; Borghi and Binkofski 2014, or Barsalou and Wiemer-
Hasting 2005.
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LOVE IS A JOURNEY
Source: journey   Target: love
the travelers     the lovers
the vehicle     the love relationship itself
the journey     events in the relationship
the distance covered   the progress made
the obstacles encountered the diffi culties experienced
decisions about the way to go  choices about what to do
the destination of the journey  the goal(s) of the relationship 
           (Kövecses 2010: 9)
Mappings such as these help us interpret metaphorical utterances. In 
saying something like “We are at a crossroads”, “This isn’t going any-
where”, or “Look how far we’ve come” your partner is exploiting the 
love-is-a-journey mapping. And abstract concepts are metaphorical in 
that their understanding is also based on conceptual metaphors such 
as the above one.6 Yet understanding is achieved not just by mapping 
elements from one domain onto elements of the other domain. We also 
‘map’ knowledge. We know certain things about journeys, for example, 
and we use that knowledge in order to understand what love is. We try 
to understand love in terms of and by what we know about journeys (cf. 
Lakoff 1993: 206−207). More specifi cally, we come to employ patterns 
of inference that we commonly use to reason about journeys in order to 
reason about love. We know that when one encounters obstacles while 
travelling or is in danger of getting lost it might be advisable to engage 
a tour guide. Analogously, one may come to realize that when one en-
counters diffi culties in a love relationship, it might be helpful to engage 
a psychotherapist as a kind of tour guide, etc. What is mapped are 
structural relationships. Conceptual metaphors, therefore, come out 
as analogies,7 as structure-preserving mappings, an idea that is most 
clearly expressed in structure-mapping theory as initially developed by 
Dedre Gentner (1980: 1983).8
The basic intuition is that an analogy is a mapping of knowledge from one 
domain (the base) into another (the target), which conveys that a system 
of relations that holds among the base objects also hold among the target 
6 Of course, there are other ways to conceptualize the domain LOVE. Love may 
be a game, or a plant that needs nurturing, and so on and so forth. Yet Lakoff and 
Johnson insist that all love-related metaphors are “signifi cantly constitutive of our 
concept of love” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 71–72).
7 The idea that metaphor is based on analogy goes back at least to Aristotle.
8 As Dedre Gentner and Brian Bowdle point out, not all metaphors are analogies; 
some “defy description in terms of alignment”, especially certain poetic metaphors 
such as the following one (if it is a metaphor) from a poem by E. E. Cummings 
“The voice of your eyes is deeper than all the roses” (cf. Gentner and Bowdle 2008: 
110) Also, they defend the ‘Career of metaphor hypothesis’, according to which “a 
metaphor undergoes a process of gradual abstraction and conventionalization as 
it evolves from its fi rst novel use to becoming a conventional ‘stock’ metaphor.” 
(Gentner and Bowdle 2008: 116).
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objects. (Gentner and Clement 1988: 312–313; cf. also Gentner and Bowdle 
2008)
Structure is mapped from one domain onto another. And, again, our 
understanding of abstract terms is said to be based on metaphorical, 
analogical mappings. Metaphor comprehension, in turn, is said to be 
embodied. Unfortunately, as soon as we talk about metaphor, concep-
tions of embodiment proliferate.
6. Embodied Metaphor
First, Lakoff and colleagues claim that all complex conceptual meta-
phors can be decomposed into what they call primary metaphors.9 Pri-
mary metaphors are experientially grounded. An example of a primary 
metaphor is AFFECTION IS WARMTH.
For example, for an infant, the subjective experience of affection is typi-
cally correlated with the sensory experience of warmth, the warmth of being 
held. During the period of confl ation, associations are automatically built up 
between two domains. Later, during a period of differentiation, children are 
able to separate out the domains, but the cross-domain associations persist. 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 46)
When we were held affectionately as children, we experienced affec-
tion and warmth occurring together. We learnt to associate affection 
with warmth.10 That helps us to produce and comprehend tempera-
ture metaphors (“He greeted me warmly”). According to Lakoff (2012), 
the association claim is evidenced by various experimental fi ndings. It 
could be shown, e.g., that subjects holding a cup of hot coffee are prone 
to evaluate an imaginary individual as warm and friendly—signifi cant-
ly more so than subjects holding a cup of iced coffee (Williams/Bargh 
2008). Subjects automatically associate physical warmth with friendli-
ness. This is so, according to Lakoff, “(b)ecause primary metaphors are 
persistent (long-lasting or permanent) physical circuits in the brain.” 
(Lakoff 2012: 782)
Others claim that metaphor comprehension is embodied in that 
people understand metaphors via mental imagery. Raymond Gibbs and 
colleagues, for example, claim that people understand metaphors con-
taining an action verb by imagining themselves engaging in that very 
action (Gibbs 2006). They conduct psycholinguistic studies in order to 
corroborate their claim. Mostly, they let participants read metaphori-
cal sentences, the sentence “Let us stomp out racism”, e.g., and then 
9 The LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor is also built up of various primary 
metaphors (cf. Lakoff 2008: 26−27). Still, one might wonder whether all complex 
metaphors are decomposable into primary metaphors and what exactly the principles 
of (de)composition amount to.
10 According to Lakoff, thought in general is embodied: “Thought is embodied, 
that is, the structures used to put together our conceptual system grow out of bodily 
experience and make sense in terms of it; moreover, the core of our conceptual system 
is directly grounded in perception, body movement, and experience of a physical and 
social character” (Lakoff 1987: xiv).
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ask them what is “particularly noticeable” (Gibbs and Mattlock 2008: 
166) in the image they form. And according to Gibbs, the participants 
conceive of racism as if it was a physical object–thereby employing the 
metaphor IDEAS ARE OBJECTS–and then they imagine their bodies 
in action, imagine themselves stomping (Gibbs and Matlock 2008).
This brings to the fore two new embodiment claims, one according 
to which
EC: Association is necessary for metaphor comprehension,
and one according to which
EC: Mental imagery is necessary for metaphor comprehension.
But now recall the initial embodiment claim. Applied to the case of 
metaphor, it comes to this:
EC: Simulation is necessary for metaphor comprehension.
One might think that mental imagery and simulation are simply two 
sides of the same coin. But although there is, presumably, a close 
connection here, mental imagery is the conscious evoking of a men-
tal image, while simulation–in the sense at issue here–is (presumably 
sub-conscious) activation in sensory-motor regions of the brain. Conse-
quently, evidence for a necessary role of simulation in metaphor com-
prehension ought to come from neuroimaging studies. Yet in a careful-
ly designed fMRI-study by Shirley-Ann Rüschemeyer and colleagues, it 
could be shown that the comprehension of metaphorical uses of action 
verbs (“grasp the idea”) doesn’t yield the same motor activation pattern 
as the comprehension of literal uses of action verbs (“grasp the cup”) 
(Rueschemeyer et al. 2007). Lisa Aziz-Zadeh and colleagues reached a 
similar conclusion (Aziz-Zadeh et al. 2006). Others disagree (cf, e.g., 
Boulenger, Hauk and Pulvermüller 2009). And still others claim that 
activation in primary motor regions is necessary only for the interpre-
tation of unfamiliar metaphors (Desai et al. 2011). In sum, empirical 
evidence for an indispensable role of simulation in metaphor compre-
hension is inconclusive (for a more comprehensive yet still critical as-
sessment, cf., e.g., Casasanti and Gijssels 2015).
But even aside from questions about its empirical support, the 
claim that metaphor comprehension is embodied either in the associa-
tion, the mental imagery or the simulation sense, faces a couple of more 
‘theoretical’ problems.
Take association fi rst. It does not seem implausible to assume that 
association underlies our understanding of temperature metaphors 
(“She greeted my warmly”). It might also help explain how we under-
stand synaesthetic metaphors such as “The stone statue had a cold 
smell” (Werning et al. 2006: 2365).11 Yet note that these metaphors are 
11 They defi ne the relevant terms as follows: “A metaphor is synaesthetic if and 
only if its source domain is perceptual. It is only weakly synaesthetic if its target is 
not also perceptual and strongly synaesthetic if its target domain, too, is perceptual.” 
(Werning et al. 2006: 2365–2366).
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not based on structure-preserving mappings, for there is no structure 
to be preserved or mapped; they therefore fail to fulfi ll Lakoff’s own 
characterization. Comprehending metaphors that are based on map-
pings, on the other hand, requires more than just association. In un-
derstanding the LOVE IS A JOURENEY metaphor, e.g., you are not 
just associating two domains. Rather, you are using knowledge of one 
domain to better understand the other. Mere association won’t do. As 
a consequence, one might try to distinguish two types of metaphors; 
those, which are based on association and those which are predomi-
nately based on domain knowledge.
Similarly in the case of mental imagery. Imagery might provide a 
good place to start when it comes to interpreting novel or poetic meta-
phors. When reading the following two lines
Two roads diverged in the wood, and I
I took the one less traveled by.
of the famous poem “The Road not Taken” by Robert Frost, you might 
immediately form an image of someone travelling on his own, being 
alone in the woods and so on. The mental image, by providing you with 
detailed pictorial and also even affective information about how it feels 
to be alone in the woods, might help you to grasp the metaphor. Re-
uven Tsur, one of the founding fathers of cognitive poetics, stresses 
the role of concrete visual images in the interpretation of metaphor in 
particular and of poetry in general (Tsur 1999). But what about other 
metaphors; e.g., the metaphor ‘Man is a wolf’? What am I supposed 
to imagine here? I might imagine a wolf in man’s clothing. But in the 
mind of others the metaphor might conjure up other images, men pack-
hunting, for example. Again, domain (encyclopedic) knowledge does 
most of the work. As Max Black pointed out, the MAN IS A WOLF 
metaphor “will not convey its intended meaning to a reader suffi ciently 
ignorant about wolves.” (Black 1955: 287) Only if you are suffi ciently 
knowledgeable will the wolf-metaphor organize your view of man, as 
Black puts it (ibid, 288). Again, one might try to distinguish different 
types of metaphor according to the cognitive processes most likely in-
volved in their interpretation.
Finally, consider simulation again. In order to understand meta-
phoric expressions such as ‘He grasped the idea’ or ‘man is a wolf’, one 
has to fi gure out what grasping a cup and grasping an idea, or what 
man and wolf, have in common. But one also has to understand that an 
idea is grasped differently than a cup and that man is not a wolf! Oth-
erwise one will not recognize them as metaphors. MAN IS A WOLF is 
a metaphor exactly because man is NO wolf! And “He grasped the idea” 
is a metaphorical expression because we grasp an idea in a manner 
that is somehow similar but also somehow different from the manner 
in which we grasp a cup! Simulating the action of grasping, thereby 
activating the same neurons as when one actually grasps a cup, is not 
what it takes to understand the metaphor. Metaphors draw on simi-
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larities–but equally on differences! Understanding metaphors requires 
that one looks at things differently than one did before! Metaphor, at 
least novel metaphor, is “a method of expanding understanding” (Sha-
piro 2011: 86). Simulation, if at all, provides us with a theory of literal 
interpretation. But interpreting metaphors requires that we leave the 
literal meaning behind.
 Now recall that CTM not only claims that metaphor comprehen-
sion is embodied but also that conceptual metaphors help us under-
stand, are even “signifi cantly constitutive” of, abstract concepts. Yet 
that claim, as has often been pointed out, is also fraught with problems. 
Let me mention just one (for some more, cf., e.g., Kompa forthcom-
ing). CTM makes wrong predictions about the way in which abstract 
concepts are best learned. “What is love?” the little boy asks. “A jour-
ney”, his mother replies. Yet the boy is not meant to believe that love 
is a journey. Rather, he is supposed to believe (and has to learn) other 
things about love; that if two people are in love they like each other a 
lot, and want to spend time together, and so on. The ‘defi ning’ proper-
ties need to be learned independently of the mapping, it seems. And 
only distinct domains can be mapped onto each other.12 As Barsalou 
puts it: “Although metaphor most certainly plays a major role in elabo-
rating and construing abstract concepts, it is not suffi cient for repre-
senting them…” (Barsalou 1999: 600; cf. also, e.g., Murphy 1996)
7. Summary
To sum up, abstract terms are not metaphorical, nor is metaphor com-
prehension embodied. Or at least, neither association nor mental imag-
ery nor simulation seem to play an indispensible role in metaphor com-
prehension. Still, embodied approaches are right in claiming a role for 
simulation, mental imagery or association in language comprehension 
in general and metaphor comprehension in particular. It seems highly 
plausible that on hearing a particular utterance a listener will occa-
sionally simulate a previous experience or actively imagine a scenario 
that somehow fi ts the utterance. This might provide her with more de-
tailed, pictorial information about a possible way the world might be if 
the utterance is correct. Similarly, in the case of a metaphorical utter-
ance. A listener will occasionally conjure up certain images that might 
help her explore the metaphorical mapping further, especially in the 
case of novel metaphors.13 In other cases, association might provide a 
12 Domain knowledge usually precedes metaphorical mapping. As Ellen Winner 
and Howard Gardner, e.g., point out, a child’s ability to interpret metaphor is 
constrained only by what they know about the domains in question: “That is, there 
are not inherent limits on the kinds of similarities children can perceive. All that 
is necessary is suffi cient knowledge of the domains involved” (Winner and Gardner 
1993: 427).
13 Evidence concerning the neural correlates underlying the processing of novel 
metaphors is somewhat inconclusive, especially with respect to the role of the right 
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route to comprehension. But there is no reason to think that every time 
a linguistic item, let alone a metaphor, is being processed simulation, 
association, or imagery has to take place. Still, as suggested above, 
one might try to distinguish different types of metaphors according to 
the cognitive processes most likely involved in their comprehension, 
even if this will hardly yield a clear-cut distinction. So, in sum, I side 
with those who claim that in language comprehension in general, and 
metaphor comprehension in particular sensory-motor (as well as affec-
tive) information is appealed to in a context-sensitive, task-dependent 
manner (cf., e.g., Desai et al 2011,14 Desai et al. 2013;15 or van Dam et 
al. 2014?16).
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